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A B S T R A C T
Many factors can conspire to limit the scope for policy development at the national level. In this paper, we
consider whether blockages in national policy processes − resulting for example from austerity or small state
political philosophies− might be overcome by the development of more polycentric governance arrangements.
Drawing on evidence from three stakeholder workshops and ﬁfteen interviews, we address this question by
exploring the United Kingdom’s recent retrenchment in the area of climate change policy, and the ways in which
its policy community have responded. We identify two broad strategies based on polycentric principles: ‘working
with gatekeepers’ to unlock political capital and ‘collaborate to innovate’ to develop policy outputs. We then
empirically examine the advantages that these actions bring, analysing coordination across overlapping sites of
authority, such as those associated with international regimes, devolved administrations and civic and private
initiatives that operate in conjunction with, and sometimes independently of, the state. Despite constraining
political and economic factors, which are by no means unique to the UK, we ﬁnd that a polycentric climate
policy network can create opportunities for overcoming central government blockages. However, we also argue
that the ambiguous role of the state in empowering but also in constraining such a network will determine
whether a polycentric approach to climate policy and governance is genuinely additional and innovative, or
whether it is merely a temporary ‘sticking plaster’ for the retreat of the state and policy retrenchment during
austere times.
1. Introduction
In theory, nation states can be attuned to accommodate the de-
mands of long-term inter-woven social and material challenges such as
anthropogenic climate change e.g. by building non-partisan coalitions,
ensuring independent monitoring and fostering a reﬂexive policy pro-
cess (Giddens, 2009; Grin et al., 2010; Latour, 2009; Voß et al., 2009).
For example, Barry and Eckersley (2005) provide empirical evidence of
eﬀective state-based environmental stewardship such as strong colla-
boration beyond territorial boundaries, decision-making based on en-
vironmental objectives, and integrated environmental impact assess-
ments. In the right circumstances, entrepreneurial individuals can work
with(in) governments to promote innovative policies and help in-
stitutionalise state leadership (Kingdon, 1984; Lovell, 2009; Mazzucato,
2015). Accordingly, there have been high hopes for, and some em-
pirical evidence of, such leadership in the area of climate change;
especially because state governments have several rationales to act e.g.
to protect vulnerable communities and infrastructure, promote inter-
generational justice and drive economic competitiveness (Boasson and
Wettestad, 2014; Giddens, 2009; Lorenzoni and Benson, 2014; Jordan
and Huitema, 2014).
However, policy progress can also be slow and inconsistent in de-
mocratic governments for many reasons, including the veto power of
senior decision-makers and risk aversion of politicians, whose jobs
depend on re-election. This is especially true when high levels of un-
certainty and delayed or diﬀused beneﬁts are involved, which is clearly
the case with regards to climate change (Howlett, 2014; Rickards et al.,
2014; Russel and Benson, 2014). Further exacerbating this inertia is the
constant battle for political saliency at a time when many diﬀerent is-
sues are competing for a limited amount of public and political atten-
tion. Most theories of public policy treat this political agenda setting as
a zero-sum game because of policymakers’ bounded rationality and
governments’ limited capacity, and this often results in contradictory
and insecure policy trajectories (Sabatier, 2007). For instance, long-
itudinal studies have shown that reactionary rollback due to a political
swing and gradual retrenchment due to resource constraints are con-
stant threats to policy progress (Patashnik, 2014; Pierson, 2004).
The recurring theme of de-centralisation is another factor eﬀecting
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states’ governing capacities and the feasibility of certain policies
(Treisman, 2007). It is especially relevant for environmental policy
where locally sensitive, or ‘bottom-up’, and ‘polycentric’ forms of gov-
ernance are often claimed to be most eﬀective (Andersson and Ostrom,
2008; Ostrom, 2010). Here, scholars highlight the eﬃcacy and cost-
saving virtues of delivering environmental policy through civic, private
or public partnership forms and across multiple levels and scales
(Bäckstrand, 2010; Bulkeley and Newell, 2010; Bulkeley et al., 2012;
Lemos and Agrawal, 2006; Newell et al., 2012). It is suggested that
these additional opportunities for experimentation, learning, and trust
building should be particularly appealing to governments when they
face political and economic barriers to unilateral action (Cole, 2015), a
claim that this article seeks to test.
At the international level, the polycentric approach (sometimes
described as a ‘fragmentation’) is increasingly evident in political in-
stitutions and governance arrangements (Abbott, 2012; Zelli, 2011).
For example, the European Union’s (EU) principle of ‘subsidiarity’ −
that ‘rules out Union intervention when an issue can be dealt with ef-
fectively by Member States at central, regional or local level’ (Chateau,
2016, 2) − can encourage self-governance and autonomy. It also
characterises the 2015 UNFCCC Paris Agreement, which replaced ear-
lier top-down targets with a bottom-up agreement based on ‘nationally
determined contributions’.
At the national level, the rise of non-state and hybrid forms of
governance has involved community projects, private sector voluntary
agreements and a variety of market-based mechanisms. They have
forced governments to think beyond traditional state-centric policies
(Jordan, 2008; Lemos and Agrawal, 2006). The hierarchy and authority
of national governments is thus directly challenged by new initiatives
spanning multiple scales and territories (Bäckstrand, 2008; Bulkeley,
2005; Termeer et al., 2010). Whether this empowers non-state actors or
hollows out the state’s responsibilities is an ongoing debate within the
governance literature.
Following these reﬂections, we start from a view that national
government leadership on complex long-term issues such as climate
change is likely to encounter diﬃculties due to the vagaries of political
and economic trends. Therefore, we set out to explore whether gov-
ernment engagement with other actors and levels could strengthen a
policy area and help overcome blockages in central state institutions.
To explore this argument, we ﬁrst introduce the common con-
ceptualisation of the state as an autonomous unitary actor and the
structuralist understandings of its capacities that this gives rise to. Then
we describe a more relational understanding based on polycentric
governance before empirically exploring its key tenets in the UK case
study. The ﬁndings advance our understanding of 1) what policy
communities can do when faced with blockages in national policy
processes and 2) to what extent non-central government sites of au-
thority can provide eﬀective remedies to these blockages.
2. Theory
2.1. Climate change and the constraints of state-based governing
Throughout the wide-ranging and long tradition of writings on the
nation state, there is a common tendency to conﬂate the state apparatus
with broader, non-governmental, social structures and processes (for an
overview see: Chernilo, 2008). Although this ontological expedience
has produced some important analyses, e.g. political economy critiques
of capitalist states (Jessop, 1990) and various comparative typologies, it
has also steered research towards structuralist theories of statecraft at
the expense of more agency-oriented readings. Since Giddens (1984)
proposed a ‘third way’ to view structure and agency as a dualism and
the forces of globalisation diversiﬁed the governance landscape, more
relational and deterritorialised theories of the state have gained ground
(Brenner et al., 2008; Holton, 2011; Jessop, 2016; Latour, 2009; cf.
Davies, 2011).
Yet, despite a widespread retreat of the state from certain issues
and policy retrenchment in many areas− hastened by a preference for
market-based mechanisms driven by neoliberal ideology (Harvey,
2005; Cashore, 2002; Okereke, 2007)− national government policies
remain an important source of innovation and a promising area of
research, especially for climate change (Boasson, 2014; Jänicke, 2005;
Fankhauser et al., 2015; Jordan and Huitema, 2014; Townshend et al.,
2013). In 2014, a total of 804 national climate laws and policies were
in existence in the highest emitting industrialised countries
(Nachmany et al., 2014). Many of these countries have decreased their
emissions from the 1990 baseline (UNFCC, 2015), although some of
this may have happened because of the oﬀshoring of production to
industrialising countries (Peters and Hertwich, 2008). Inevitably
there are leaders and pioneers, as well as laggards, among these
countries whose high outward ambitions depend to a large extent on
their inward policy performance and consistency (Lieﬀerink and
Wurzel, 2016).
The ability of the leading European countries to advance domestic
climate policies and deploy low-carbon investment has been stymied by
the ﬁnancial crisis of 2008 and the slow recovery of national economies
(Geels, 2013; Skovgaard, 2014). Such moments of crisis and disruption
can lead to signiﬁcant policy change by prompting critical reﬂection on
the status quo and heightening the demand for a proactive response i.e.
creating a window of opportunity for entrepreneurial individuals
working within government (Bauer et al., 2012; Kingdon, 1984).
Broadly speaking, early opportunities for re-orienting socio-economic
systems towards sustainability as a response to the crisis were re-
cognised by many in the climate policy community but ultimately were
not achieved because of resistance from vested interests and entrenched
economic biases blocking such innovation (Geels, 2013).
Marxist and political economic critiques of capitalist states and so-
cieties have long pointed to the fundamental constraints of governing
within, or through, the structures of liberal-capitalist democracies
(Jessop, 1990). These analyses pay close attention to power imbalances,
but in doing so they often posit the state as a unitary actor vis-à-vis non-
state actors. This distinction is useful as a purely descriptive tool− and
indeed will be used as such in this article − but it is less helpful as an
analytical tool for understanding the dynamic power relations and so-
cial processes that take place beyond the conﬁnes of central govern-
ment institutions. These interactions still shape, and are shaped by,
public policy and governance. In practice ‘the state’ is not a distinct
actor but rather an assemblage of multiple arenas for governing col-
lective action (DeLanda, 2006; Paavola, 2011). What matters for theory
and for practice is the number and type of arenas that are engaged in a
given policy area i.e. its degree of polycentricity.
Starting from an empirical observation that monocentric forms of
climate governance (such as unilateral state action) are fraught with
structural biases and impediments to eﬀective policy development,
proponents of polycentricity have highlighted the beneﬁts of pursuing
an alternative, more pluralistic, approach (Cole, 2011; Harris, 2013;
Jordan et al., 2015; Ostrom, 2010, 2012). In essence, they claim that
the potential costs of having multiple, often overlapping, domains of
governance are outweighed by the beneﬁts of experimentation,
learning, trust building and context sensitivity (Cole, 2015).
Experimentation and learning have been argued to be able to im-
prove policy; especially in areas of high uncertainty and complexity
such as climate change (Pahl-Wostl, 2009; Ostrom, 2010). This ﬂex-
ibility, or adaptive capacity, within a governance arrangement is vital
for responding to rapid or unexpected changes in the natural environ-
ment (Pahl-Wostl, 2009) as well as in the social, political and economic
environment (Voß et al., 2009). Perhaps most relevant for our focus on
policy blockages and climate transitions is the claim that trial-and-error
development of policies at multiple governance levels can lead to in-
novation and improved outcomes, especially if it is accompanied by
close monitoring and information sharing between actors (Cole, 2015;
De Búrca et al., 2014). Put simply, a polycentric policy arena allows for
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experimentation with new ideas, whose successes can be used to de-
velop action at multiple levels and in other contexts.
Another anticipated positive eﬀect of increased connectivity and
learning interactions is to build the levels of trust and co-operation
needed to overcome politically entrenched blockages. Resisting criti-
cisms of fragmentation and atomisation, a central tenet of polycentric
governance is that the multiple sites of authority remain connected and
inter-dependent. Talk does not always lead to action, so systems of
reciprocity, reputation and mutual beneﬁt are needed to produce
greater levels of actual co-operation; something which has been reg-
ularly proven in collective action research (McGinnis, 2011; Ostrom
and Walker, 2003). Importantly, this principle applies not just to oﬃ-
cial party politics and bureaucracies, but to the plethora of ways gov-
ernance actors communicate about, and through, their policies, actions
and beliefs beyond the state (Hajer, 2009). Put simply, a polycentric
policy arena encourages greater levels of communication and trust,
capable of overcoming stand-oﬀs between diﬀerent actors.
Building on this body of theory and many years of practical appli-
cations and workshops, McGinnis (2015: 5) oﬀers a three-part deﬁni-
tion of polycentric governance consisting of:
‘(1) Multiple centers of decision-making authority with overlapping jur-
isdictions (2) which interact through a process of mutual adjustment
during which they frequently establish new formal collaborations or in-
formal commitments, and (3) their interactions generate a regularized
pattern of overarching social order which captures eﬃciencies of scale at
all levels of aggregation, including providing a secure foundation for
democratic self-governance.’
The extent to which these structures, processes and outcomes are
present will vary from case to case. In fact, it should be noted here that
the involvement of multiple (often non-state) actors in policy processes
is by no means a novel phenomenon. The point is rather that its pre-
valence is growing and that its normative claims to greater eﬃcacy
need to be examined. To this end, McGinnis postulates a number of
systemic issues responsible for policy blockages and the way they might
be ameliorated by polycentricity to produce desirable outcomes in a
given context (see Table 1).
We will test these potential remedies to systemic policy blockages in
our case study, responding to a call from Jordan et al. (2015) for more
research into why and how polycentric governance is emerging and the
role of states therein. For instance, in the ﬁeld of climate and energy,
Sovacool (2011) has shown that government policymaking and in-
stitutions play a key part in the emergence and functioning of these
polycentric processes. Our study builds on this work, examining the
eﬀorts of a broadly deﬁned policy community to overcome recent
blockages to the development of climate policy in the UK.
3. The promise and limitations of UK climate policy
Prior to 2008, the UK Government’s climate change policies were
faltering and being pursued without eﬀective coordination across
government departments and sectors (Carter and Jacobs, 2014). How-
ever, this was not for want of initiatives. Local government, civic and
private sector climate governance initiatives were plentiful and have
continued to proliferate, sometimes in concert and sometimes in tension
with government (Bulkeley and Kern, 2006; Giddens, 2009). To illus-
trate, the Nottingham Declaration in 2000 saw local governments and
cities make climate change integral to their decision-making and stra-
tegies (now with 392 signatories accounting for 90% or British coun-
cils). Low-carbon communities and grassroots projects also have a re-
latively long, if somewhat uncertain, history in the UK (see: Walker,
2011), and the country’s economy has achieved an average annual re-
duction in carbon intensity of 3.5% between 2000 and 2015 (the
highest in Europe) (PWC, 2016). However, the extent to which this
activity has been acknowledged, supported or hindered by central
government has ﬂuctuated over time.
Bringing together key actors and discourses from these numerous
sectors, a period of civil society campaigning, private sector endorse-
ments and political competition between 2006 and 2008 led to the
passing of the Climate Change Act (CCA) (Lorenzoni and Benson,
2014). This innovative policy enshrined in legislation a target of an
80% emission reduction from 1990 level by 2050. It also established
ﬁve-yearly ‘carbon budgets’ that would be proposed and monitored by a
semi-independent Committee on Climate Change (CCC). A newly cre-
ated Department for Energy and Climate Change (DECC) ensured that
there would be ministers and policy teams dedicated to achieving a low
carbon transition in social and energy systems. The Department for
Environment, Food and Rural Aﬀairs (DEFRA) remained responsible for
climate risk assessments and adaptation, being given new powers to
demand reports on progress from certain sectors.
This high level of government activity and political salience con-
tinued for some time, despite the onset of the global ﬁnancial crisis and
the failure of the UNFCCC negotiations at Copenhagen in 2009. The
ﬁrst three carbon budgets were passed into law, DECC produced a
comprehensive strategy for transforming the energy sector (HM
Government, 2009) and DEFRA began compiling a comprehensive
Climate Change Risk Assessment (DEFRA, 2012). At this time, incum-
bent politicians and those seeking election portrayed themselves, and
the UK, as leading the ﬁght against climate change. The Conservative-
Liberal Coalition elected in 2010 promised to be ‘the greenest govern-
ment ever’ (Cameron, 2010). However, early doubts were raised about
the cost eﬀectiveness of these policies and the limited inﬂuence of the
climate policy community (Lockwood, 2013; Pielke Jr, 2009). The
waning inﬂuence, interest and commitment (see also Carter and Jacobs,
2014) are reminders that ﬂagship strategic policies like the CCA are not
enough alone, they need to be followed up with consistent policy de-
velopment and implementation in multiple sectors in order to deliver
the required emissions reductions.
Some of these concerns materialised during the 2010–2015
Conservative-Liberal Coalition and intensiﬁed at the start of the 2015-
Table 1
Systemic barriers to polycentric governance and the strategies for, and beneﬁts of, overcoming them (based on McGinnis, 2015, 28).
Systemic Tendencies or Biases Sources and Reasons Remedies and Potential Beneﬁts
A. Structural Inequities Diﬀerent groups face diﬀerent costs for collective action, and high
costs can be imposed by especially successful groups
Continued access to other channels for mobilization outside existing forms of
domination
B. Incremental Bias Multiple veto points restrict range of feasible mutually beneﬁcial
adjustments
Can appeal to authorities at other levels to break an impasse at any single
level
C. High Complexity High participation costs can give current experts a big advantage
on others
Since no governance system can be complete, new forms of connections may
provide alternative paths to participation
D. Deep Structural Fissures Each policy domain may be dominated by network of incumbents
insulated from outside pressure
Interconnectedness between policy domains will change with new
technologies and systemic shocks
E. Coordination Failures Dilemmas of collective action are especially diﬃcult at high levels
of aggregation
Gaps or failures in coordination exposed at one level can inspire eﬀorts of
other actors at lower levels, or leadership from above
F. Lack of Normative Clarity No single goal will be consistently pursued by all actors at all
levels
Drawing attention to multiple goals encourages open deliberation and builds
legitimacy for policy decisions
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Conservative majority Government. Previously prominent arguments
from the CCC, DECC and DEFRA were drowned out by the politics and
discourse of austerity, whilst disagreements between departments and
ministers made it diﬃcult to build trust or to send consistent policy
signals. Senior politicians sought to reign in the UK’s leadership posi-
tion and make any new targets conditional on parity with other
European countries (Gillard, 2016). Under the banner of austerity,
DECC and DEFRA suﬀered signiﬁcant budget cuts, which also limited
their capacity to develop policy.
4. Methodological considerations
The growing tension between ambitious policy targets and con-
strained political and economic circumstances informed our case study
selection. Many European economies have been slow to recover from
the ﬁnancial crisis of 2008, which has had both political and policy
eﬀects. Interestingly in this context, some governments − such as the
UK− have continued to declare themselves as leaders in investing in a
low-carbon economy and intervening to transform the energy system
whilst simultaneously prioritising austerity policies and deregulation.
By selecting a case study where this tension is particularly pronounced
we are able to present ﬁndings that advance knowledge through ‘the
power of example’ and can inform analyses of other countries and
policy areas facing similar challenges (Flyvbjerg, 2006).
We consider that the UK climate policy community− policymakers
and non-governmental actors and stakeholders with a vested interest in
achieving climate policy goals − have been actively searching for in-
novative solutions to overcome the challenges encountered in the key
departments in central government. The UK climate policy area can be
described and analysed as, to a greater or lesser extent, polycentric:
inasmuch as the central government is not a ‘monolithic actor’ and the
state constitutes a ‘set of arenas and instruments for collective action’
(Paavola, 2011, 418). This climate policy community involves a mix-
ture of state and non-state actors and venues, resisting the temptation
towards methodological nationalism (Chernilo, 2008) to pay close at-
tention to the way their inter-relations produce public policy and cli-
mate governance initiatives.
The formulation and implementation of climate policy depends on
the input of various civic, private and expert actors to e.g. community
energy schemes, supply chain resilience and low-carbon technology
(Bulkeley and Kern, 2006). For example, the UK’s membership of the
EU (prior to the process embarked upon following the referendum in
June 2016), its devolved authorities (Northern Ireland, Scotland and
Wales) and its localism agenda that seeks to empower cities, regions
and communities mean there are several venues for decentralised in-
novation. Many of these venues for climate policy have been active
prior to the timeframe that is the focus of this article. As such, it is not
our intention to prove a quantiﬁable step-change towards polycentric
policy over time, but to determine the extent to which it provides a
solution to the challenges and blockages currently being encountered
by policymakers in central government.
Our analysis is primarily based on discussions at three participatory
workshops (n28, 27, 15 participants respectively). The participants in-
cluded government actors from senior, strategic and operational levels,
climate change and energy policy experts, consultants, communications
specialists and academics. The workshops were carried out under the
Chatham House Rule (Chatham House, 2016) to allow participants to
contribute freely rather than as representatives of their organisations.
Participants co-produced a set of reﬂections on the barriers to, and op-
portunities for, climate policy innovations but all interpretation and
analysis of these discussions presented in this article are the responsi-
bility of the authors. Semi-structured interviews were also carried out
with 15 key members of climate policy community to explore their
strategies and rationales for advancing climate policy. Finally, doc-
umentary material such as policy documents, and government and non-
government reports was used to triangulate these accounts.
5. Analysis
In this section, we brieﬂy present the outcomes of the workshops
and interviews that related to the political and economic structural
factors aﬀecting UK climate policymakers’ capacity for developing their
area, as well as their proposed strategic responses. Many of these issues
have been raised elsewhere in the literature (Carter and Jacobs, 2014;
Gillard, 2016; Lockwood, 2013). Our evidence reconﬁrms their im-
portance and presents, for the ﬁrst time, some insights into how pol-
icymakers and stakeholders respond during such turbulent times.
We then scrutinise the ways in which polycentricity presents op-
portunities for policymakers to overcome policy blockages, whilst also
considering its limitations. Crucially we see all governance actors as
sites of authority in their own right; that is not as pawns in govern-
mental strategies but as co-producers and (relatively) autonomous
drivers of climate policy and actions. Their level of authority and
agency may be in part determined by their interactions with the state,
but it is also drawn from elsewhere and enacted through non-state
channels. Therefore our analysis is based on a relational view of agency
and power; seeing polycentricity as expressed through socio-political
interactions between multiple public (state based), private and civic
actors.
First, we demonstrate how international linkages can pull in both
directions, advancing ambition and undermining it. Second, devolved
authorities such as nations and cities can outpace central government
but their capacity to do so is shaped by the limits of their self-rule and
how eﬀectively they can work with transnational networks and the
private sector. Lastly we show the importance of adopting a colla-
borative (not prescriptive) approach to working with industry and civil
society. These ﬁndings are summarised in Table 2.
5.1. Structural challenges and strategic responses
In the six years following the ﬁnancial crash of 2008, macro-eco-
nomic trends such as slow growth of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and
high levels of government debt (Oﬃce for Budget Responsibility, 2011,
2012) reinforced the view among some politicians and some sectors of
the public that new, and existing, climate policies could not be af-
forded. Though these views were not completely hegemonic, arguments
about long-term or non-ﬁscal beneﬁts of a green economy were often
deemed untenable a priori by policymakers. One strategic level inter-
viewee captured this succinctly by deﬁning their overarching mandate
as working out ‘how to do more with less’.
Signiﬁcant budget cuts were imposed on government departments
(notably DECC and DEFRA) and on local governments (HM Treasury,
2015), which had a negative impact on climate policymaking. Fiscal
restraints also exacerbated a silo mentality: departments focused their
resources on core work and marginal adjustments rather than on
crosscutting issues like climate change. DECC’s plans were constrained
by a cap on spending (HM Treasury, 2011), resulting in cuts to re-
newable energy subsidies and policy decisions being forced upon them
by the Treasury. Eventually, in 2016, they were subsumed into the
Department for Business Innovations and Skills.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, we found that policymakers were seeking to
increase their engagement with a wider set of actors and institutions
beyond central government. Actions fell into two broad strategies, ex-
plicitly based on the assumption that overcoming policy blockages
would require a polycentric approach. The strategy of ‘working with
gatekeepers and champions’ was intended to unlock political capital by
developing dialogues and commitments across policy areas and by re-
framing climate change so that it appealed to centre-right political
preferences, climate sceptics and disengaged senior strategists. The
strategy of ‘collaborate to innovate’ included more consultations prior
to decisions, drawing on ex post analysis and expert evidence, localised
climate messages to discuss context-sensitive policies, and utilising
joint-funding and more applied research and development schemes in
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the private sector. Many elements of these strategies have been a part of
the UK climate policy area for some time, but there was an explicit
acknowledgment that increasing these activities was necessary for
overcoming current and future constraints, especially as targets and
policy decisions become more challenging over time.
5.2. Engaging with multiple sites of authority
5.2.1. The international climate regime and the european union
Many interviewees had a positive view of international climate
politics, despite sharing reservations about the eﬃcacy of dealing with
climate change at such a high level. As shown above, the UK’s position
as an international leader has been an important part of the story. This
position was based on the perceived success of its domestic legislation,
which underpinned diplomacy and policy diﬀusion eﬀorts. The Minister
for Energy and Climate Change (Amber Rudd) and DECC’s Director of
International Climate Change (Peter Betts) demonstrated this leverage
in Paris in 2015 by steering the ﬁnal agreement towards a model that
resembles the UK’s framework of a long-term target broken down into
ﬁve-yearly monitoring periods.
Such mutually reinforcing overlaps between national and interna-
tional governance create pressure on national policy, but their eﬀects
are neither immediate nor guaranteed. For instance, the Paris
Agreement on a more stringent target limiting global warming to 1.5 °
Celsius prompted UK policymakers to promise a new domestic ‘net zero’
emissions target. Yet the CCC chose not to revise its proposed target,
despite concerted pressure from environmental campaigners, on the
grounds that it would suﬃce as an absolute minimum for the UK’s
contribution to the global target and that domestic policy was already
falling short of this (CCC, 2016a). This illustrates the limitation of the
CCC’s purely advisory mandate and represents a missed opportunity for
building reciprocity between policymakers at the two levels.
Similarly, eﬀorts to feed commitments and ideas from the interna-
tional level into adjacent policy areas such as raising public awareness
and climate change education have been very limited; representing
another missed opportunity for establishing new connections across
sectors and generations. Despite these shortcomings and the failure of
potential polycentric beneﬁts to be secured, most policymakers and
non-government organisations remained optimistic about the political
value of maintaining a leadership position internationally and the in-
stitutional pressure it exerts on domestic actors.
For those seeking global agreements on climate change, the UK’s
relationship with the EU has moved in an even less positive direction.
Negotiating at the UNFCCC as a member of the EU, the UK has
traditionally been seen as a leader within the bloc; pushing for stronger
targets and monitoring frameworks. This situation was unsettled by a
referendum on the UK’s membership of the EU. After a series of suc-
cessful negotiations in 2014 to align climate and renewable energy
targets, this work was ‘largely seen as done’ by some policymakers.
The 2016 referendum result has now potentially undone much of
the beneﬁts from this work. By voting to leave the EU the UK closed a
signiﬁcant source of policies (e.g. renewable energy targets) and ﬁ-
nancing (worth 3.5bn Euros during the period 2014–2020) for climate
and energy schemes (Froggatt et al., 2016). Most pertinently from the
polycentric perspective, the impending loss of the inﬂuence of EU
regulations and legal oversight represents a signiﬁcant decrease in the
number of mechanisms for monitoring − and thereby encouraging −
cooperation on climate goals. Furthermore, the referendum result re-
presents the loss of a vital multi-level governance connection for the
UK’s devolved authorities (Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland) and
cities that previously beneﬁtted greatly from EU policies, ﬁnance and
networks.
5.2.2. Ambition, constraints and bottom-up innovation in devolved
authorities and cities
The UK’s devolved nations oﬀer clear examples of non-central
government actors looking for ways to develop a faltering policy area
and encourage experimentation. The Scottish Government’s equivalent
of the CCA incorporated emissions reductions beyond its share for
achieving the UK target, and at a quicker pace (Scottish Parliament,
2009; CCC, 2016b). In Wales a 3% annual emission reduction target
enables a more comprehensive and explicit application to diﬀerent
sectors than the UK’s aggregate targets (Welsh Assembly Government,
2010a). Scotland and Wales have also legislated on targets and strate-
gies for meeting all of their electricity and energy needs with renewable
and low-carbon sources by 2020 and 2050 respectively (Scottish
Government, 2011; Welsh Assembly Government, 2010b); whereas the
UK Parliament rejected such an approach by narrowly voting against an
explicit power sector decarbonisation target.
The higher ambition in devolved authorities does ﬁlter into speciﬁc
policy decisions at other levels, sometimes standing in direct contrast to
central government. For instance, onshore wind continued to be a
priority in Scotland whereas the UK Government halted it in England
and Wales. The Welsh Government has less control over large energy
infrastructure decisions but has developed plans for a world-ﬁrst tidal
lagoon project in Swansea. It also has a more generous and consistent
record of supporting micro-generation energy projects.
Such ambitious and experimental sub-national policies may act as
Table 2
examples of barriers to, and opportunities for, the realisation of polycentric ideals in UK climate policy.
Systemic Tendencies or
Biases
Sources and Reasons Remedies and Potential Beneﬁts
A. Structural Inequities Homogenous groups with a small focus such as campaigns against wind
farms or heavy industry against carbon taxes were more successful at
inﬂuencing speciﬁc policies than heterogeneous groups such as
‘environmentalists’ who may have diﬀering views on the details of how to
achieve broad goals.
Environment and climate coalitions were able to reach beyond site-
speciﬁc interests to mobilise support from various interest groups and
inﬂuence from multiple institutions.
B. Incremental Bias Powerful and numerous veto points within central government such as the
Treasury and Cabinet Ministers made radical climate policy decisions
unlikely.
Devolved authorities and cities set more ambitious targets and pioneer
innovative policies in sectors they have control over.
C. High Complexity Local governance initiatives such as community energy or low carbon
businesses struggled to compete with more established and dominant
ﬁrms.
City Deals, Local Enterprise Partnerships and trans-national networks all
opened up avenues for accessing policy support and new markets.
D. Deep Structural
Fissures
Climate policymakers found it diﬃcult to connect with some other policy
sectors and departments e.g. education and DCLG.
Communications specialists and think tanks helped connect climate
change to other issue areas and centre-right ideologies.
E. Coordination Failures Lack of coordination between Coalition parties, Cabinet Ministers and
central government departments produced mixed messages and
uncertainty.
Private sector actors and cities seized the initiative with certain policy
ideas; international and trans-national actors pushed for more ambitious
targets.
F. Lack of Normative
Clarity
The rationale and methods for pursuing of a low-carbon lifestyle diﬀers
between community groups and government actors.
Voices from the private and civic sector were sought by policymakers to
help develop a shared narrative about the low-carbon transition.
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pilots of innovation, to be learnt from and even adopted later by na-
tional government. This was the case when Scotland and Wales in-
troduced a plastic bag levy that was later adopted in England after its
positive impacts were monitored and evaluated (Welsh Government,
2016; Zero Waste Scotland, 2015). Another example emerged from our
workshop discussions, as policymakers sought to draw lessons from the
perceived success of Greener Scotland’s environment and climate
change communication strategy. This was primarily driven by in-
dividuals who were part of wider policymaking networks because no
formal channels for facilitating such learning within the climate policy
area were identiﬁed as successful. Conﬁrming the ‘more connections,
more innovation’ hypothesis of polycentric governance, this suggests
that learning lessons from experimentation is a valuable addition, but
that it may be quicker and more eﬀective when formally supported
rather than simply as a by-product of pioneers leading by example.
Sub-national actors may also seek to circumvent their national
governments. Scotland has 25% of Europe’s oﬀshore wind and tidal
potential and has attracted tens of millions of Euros from the EU for
renewable energy projects (European Commission, 2014). Wales also
drew a ﬁnancial net beneﬁt from the EU in 2014 (Ifan et al., 2016),
much of which has been spent on innovative tidal energy projects and
adaptation initiatives in coastal communities. Scotland and Wales are
also active in transnational networks of devolved authorities that en-
gage in climate governance initiatives such as the Climate Group’s
States and Regions Alliance. Recourse to these other levels and channels
can help to sidestep the entrenched power relations and impasses of
central government policymaking, oﬀering new sources of information,
funding and policy.
In England, legislation was introduced to accelerate the devolution
of power, giving ‘new freedoms and ﬂexibilities to local government’
and ‘new rights and powers for communities and individuals’ (DCLG,
2011, 3). This included provisions giving local government and city
councils speciﬁc powers such as control over prioritisation of economic
sectors and public spending. Interestingly, these 26 ‘City Deals’ were
guided by principles akin to those of polycentricity: creating another
site of authority, encouraging collaboration between public and private
actors, and seeking eﬃciencies of scale (HM Government, 2011, 20).
The use of such policy discourse suggests the potential virtues of a
polycentric approach are being recognised and legitimised, although it
does not yet reveal the underlying rationale for their adoption or the
details of their enactment.
Several interviewees saw the City Deals as a good idea in principle
but underperforming in practice. This was largely attributed to the fact
that they were overseen by two departments who were overtly unin-
terested in climate change, and partly because they came at a time
when local government budgets were being heavily cut. City level in-
terviewees corroborated this, reporting diﬃculties in ﬁnding central
government support for climate change related initiatives, even when
the business case was strong and the social beneﬁts were clear (e.g.
energy eﬃciency investment to reduce emissions and fuel poverty).
Devolving responsibilities can thus be described as a move towards self-
governance and autonomy but, in the context of a 51% cut to the
Department for Communities and Local Government between 2010 and
2015 (HM Treasury, 2015), it can also be described as passing the buck.
Several city level actors also underlined that working with central
policymakers is not the only option. They highlighted the importance of
transnational networks like C40 and the Compact of Mayors in pro-
moting the inﬂuence of cities, sharing knowledge, and collaborating on
mitigation and adaptation governance. Within the UK, the Core Cities
group is one such example, being a successful collaboration between
the 10 biggest city economies outside of London. For example, in
conjunction with the capital city and private sector energy companies
they developed an innovative retroﬁtting scheme to reduce emissions
from public buildings without needing additional up-front public ﬁ-
nance; a clear example of experimental governance succeeding in a
policy area blighted by underfunding and inertia.
5.2.3. A problem shared is a problem halved: working with private
enterprise and civil society to build a low-carbon coalition
In workshop discussions and interviews, policymakers expressed a
desire to create a sense of ‘shared ownership’ of the problem of climate
change. It was felt that this resonated with the broader neoliberal ap-
proach to small-state governance − exempliﬁed by the Government’s
‘Big Society’ agenda (Cabinet Oﬃce, 2010) − and that it had already
proven successful in building co-operation in the run up to the passing
of the CCA and the UNFCCC conference in Paris (Jacobs, 2016). Yet, it
was acknowledged that ‘no single goal would be prioritised by ev-
eryone’, and that this potential lack of clarity was not something for
government to try to control. Rather, it was hoped that by bringing a
range of leading voices together a shared narrative would emerge.
Thereby increasing the legitimacy and acceptability of future climate
policies and governance arrangements, and also putting pressure on
central government to send consistent messages of support − even
during periods of austerity and low prioritisation of climate change.
Importantly this was not seen solely as an issue of public relations,
but one of democratic participation. Many policymakers cited the
Government’s Open Policymaking initiative as a benchmark, which had
provided the tools for including a broad range of expertise and feedback
during all stages of the policy process. If successful, this sort of gov-
ernance arrangement can provide a forum for increased communication
and learning between stakeholders without requiring signiﬁcant addi-
tional expenditure or legislation at a time when government is disin-
clined towards either.
Policymaking collaborations between the state and the private
sector have been increasingly popular in the UK and other countries
with liberalised markets. Mobilising private capital to produce social
and environmental beneﬁts can be eﬀective during times of limited
public ﬁnances. For example, the Carbon Trust’s ﬁve-year Oﬀshore
Wind Accelerator project combined public ﬁnance with considerable
investment and expertise of nine oﬀshore wind companies to reduce
costs, furthering the competitiveness of this form of renewable energy.
Companies seeking ﬁrst-mover advantages have also acted in-
dependently, drawing on the latest climate science and policy trajec-
tories e.g. using internal carbon pricing to guide their investment
strategies and pledging to become powered entirely by renewable en-
ergy. Interviewees felt that there were many such success stories in the
UK and even a critical mass of actors committed to tackling climate
change even when governments and markets were less assured. As an
example of this sentiment, they cited the World Economic Forum’s open
letter to government leaders in 2015 urging stronger climate action.
This stemmed from the recognition that more needs to be done to
prepare and promote low-carbon business messages in conjunction with
governments to overcome apparent contradictions in interest and pre-
ferences. Private sector voluntary agreements are often used to pre-
emptively stave oﬀ government regulation, but they also indicate a
willingness to go beyond lagging policies and thus are an opportunity to
innovate when public ﬁnances and political capital are limited.
The state also plays an important but ambiguous role in shaping civil
society climate actions such as community energy and behaviour change
schemes. These schemes often focus on energy eﬃciency measures, re-
newable energy development and low consumption lifestyles. Public
policy and top-down intervention may enhance their success (e.g. by
establishing feed-in-tariﬀs for renewable energy, setting up knowledge
sharing networks and providing frameworks for measuring impact) but
they are not always dependable revenue streams and their governance
rules may even be counterproductive to the aims and functioning of
community projects (for UK examples see: Aiken, 2016; Markantoni,
2016; Walker, 2011). The many examples of failed or faltering commu-
nity level low-carbon energy schemes serve as a reminder that favourable
conditions for polycentric experimentation need to be maintained, and
that governments have a continued role to play in this.
More broadly, the high costs of competing in a liberalised market
and of meeting regulatory requirements may limit the ability of these
R. Gillard et al. Global Environmental Change 45 (2017) 174–182
179
civic initiatives to scale up their impact, but several of our interviewees
and workshop participants saw their increasing prevalence as a positive
sign. Their popularity, cost-eﬃciency, co-beneﬁts and localised gov-
ernance structures were all lauded, but policymakers need to provide
more reliable support and to see them as co-producers of an inclusive
and pluralistic low-carbon transition, not merely expendable experi-
ments.
6. Discussion: polycentricity and the ambiguous role of
government
As austerity took hold across Europe in the wake of the 2008 ﬁ-
nancial crisis, governments inclined to reduce regulation and public
spending were able to justify implementing severe cuts. As a result, in
the UK, the climate policy community faced signiﬁcant blockages to
policy development (conﬁrming the theoretical and empirical hy-
potheses of Bauer et al., 2012; Lockwood, 2013; Gillard, 2016). Despite
independent progress reports stressing the need to maintain ambition
and to increase policy development to meet future targets (CCC, 2014,
2016a), climate change was eﬀectively de-prioritised by central gov-
ernment. Our ﬁndings should resonate with other countries and policy
areas marked by state retreat or policy retrenchment, and they will
certainly be of interest within the UK where limited policymaking re-
sources continue to be cut (e.g. DECC being subsumed into BIS) or are
being focused on other priorities (e.g. negotiating an exit from the EU).
What can policymakers do when faced with such a predicament and
what is their rationale for acting? The UK climate policy community
responded to the above challenges by pursuing two broad strategies: 1)
appealing to inﬂuential individuals and 2) seeking out new collabora-
tions. The assumption that leadership could not come from government
alone underpinned these strategies. Another key assumption was that
policy innovations would require linking top-down inﬂuence with
bottom-up creativity. Interviewees reported numerous sites where these
strategies play out, such as international institutions, transnational
networks, devolved authorities, cities, and private enterprise and
community groups. It is in the interactions between these multiple sites
of authority that issues of relational power and policy development can
be seen.
Our case study provides examples of a positive contribution of a
broad network of actors to climate policy, which at least partially ful-
ﬁlled the deﬁnition and promises of polycentric governance as laid out
by McGinnis (2015), Cole (2015) and Jordan et al. (2015). The network
helped produce new formal governance arrangements and informal
commitments for tackling climate change across multiple levels, in-
stitutions and sectors (e.g. nationally determined contributions, re-
newable energy targets, voluntary actions among businesses, and
pledges between cities and communities). In cases of public-private ﬁ-
nancing, City Deals, and community energy they also produced eﬃ-
ciencies of scale and self-governance.
These successes may be in part due to the speciﬁcs of the UK case,
but broad lessons can still be drawn from these and explored in other
contexts of policy blockage. For instance, the relatively long history of
non-state climate action in the UK showed the importance of being able
to draw on past experience and existing relationships when developing
innovations. Further, the widely perceived success of the CCA enabled
policymakers to re-direct limited resources towards complementary
forms of governance, showing the importance of maintaining political
and public support for national level strategies (Cao and Ward, 2016).
Extending these arguments, we contend that a polycentric approach
will be most eﬀective when it is additional to, not a replacement for,
strong central government leadership. Without this overt shared com-
mitment and reciprocity there is a danger that progress will be halted in
times of crisis or that contrary policy decisions may appear to have no
political cost.
Does all of this polycentric activity achieve tangible results beyond
the existing state-based policies such as the CCA and its carbon
budgets? Although such policy outcomes are diﬃcult to calculate at the
aggregate level of emissions reductions (Hertin et al., 2009), it is pos-
sible to argue for three signiﬁcant advantages for policy processes and
outputs. First, by coordinating with other (sometimes more receptive)
levels and sectors the wider climate policy community was able to put
pressure on central government, or even to circumvent it entirely.
Second, these channels also provided extra opportunities for experi-
mentation, learning and diﬀusion (Loorbach, 2010; Voß et al., 2009),
e.g. when devolved authorities outpaced the national level and busi-
nesses trialled higher carbon prices. Third, the increased connections
between the state and other actors and levels oﬀered the necessary
scope to begin to build a shared narrative for fostering trust and social
buy-in necessary to implement ambitious and broadly supported cli-
mate policies (Stirling, 2011). Each of these illustrates the potential
value of relational forms of power and inﬂuence within, and beyond,
the structures of the nation state.
Although our case study aligned with McGinnis’ (2015) tripartite
deﬁnition of a polycentric system of governance, the exact contours of
the UK climate policy area were left deliberately open. Future analyses
could examine more tightly deﬁned policy areas or sub-systems of cli-
mate policy (e.g. the renewable energy sector or local adaptation) to
provide more comparative evidence and clarify certain theoretical and
applied issues e.g. the ambiguous role of government and claims of
scalar eﬃciency. On the latter point, proving such an ‘economic divi-
dend’ would certainly strengthen the case for pursuing greater poly-
centricity in other ﬁscally constrained countries and policy areas (Pike
et al., 2012).
The ability of other countries and policy communities to replicate the
same positive eﬀects seen in the UK case is not necessarily assured. This
will likely be aﬀected by many context speciﬁc variables e.g. the level of
decentralisation, pre-existing actor networks, institutionalised power
relations, styles of policymaking, legislative context, and activeness of
civic and private sectors. However, it certainly seems plausible that in-
creasing polycentricity is a desirable, and eﬀective, strategy for over-
coming national level blockages e.g. recently in the USA, Congress has
blocked climate policies but at the state level there are prominent leaders
(California) and collaborations (Compact of Mayors).
Our ﬁndings showed that policymakers actively tried to enhance
their engagement with other sites of authority. At the time, this ﬁt well
with the government’s ‘Big Society’ rhetoric, deregulation agenda, and
public spending cuts; raising concerns about the potential ‘Janus-face’
of neoliberal governance as a response to constrained public ﬁnances
(Davies, 2011; Swyngedouw, 2005). In other words, the turn to non-
state actors should not be considered a de facto solution to central state
inaction (Paavola et al., 2009). Our case study chimes with other cri-
tical research that has raised this issue. For instance, devolution of re-
sources to sub-national actors can be insuﬃcient to match their new
responsibilities, and the new relationship to the state that it produces
can be deliberately managed to favour other (more central) priorities or
to spread the blame for policy failures (Muinzer, 2016; Royles and
McEwen, 2016). Similarly, civil society initiatives and local enterprise
partnerships are at risk of being instrumentalised by the state, i.e.
turned into the subjects, rather than curators, of social change (Aiken,
2016; Davies, 2011; Lever, 2005).
7. Conclusion
Long-term policy development and state-based governance may be
hampered by multiple factors such as economic and political cycles, as
well as by the tendency towards silo thinking and entrenched power
relations of central government structures. This is especially true for
policy areas marked by uncertainty, vested interests, and complex
economic or scientiﬁc forecasting that is open to multiple interpreta-
tions and priorities.
As we have shown in the case of UK climate change policy, state
leadership through targets and policy frameworks is vital to raise
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ambition and monitor progress. However, it requires consistent policy
development to maintain the trajectory and to deliver tangible interim
achievements (e.g. annual emissions reductions). However, economic
downturns and changes in political priorities can cause domestic pro-
gress to slow and an implementation gap to emerge. Such blockages
may also limit the scope for policy innovation and leadership from
other actors, raising important questions about governmental con-
straints on the agency of non-state actors or governance arrangements.
At such times policymakers may turn to other sites of authority that
oﬀer alternative channels of inﬂuence and innovation, as well as the
potential for achieving eﬃciencies of scale. Countries with more de-
volved power structures, and politically engaged private and civic
sectors, are well placed to cultivate such polycentric networks.
However, our ﬁnal contention is that the underlying rationale for
governments’ interactions with these other sites of authority− and the
relational power through which this is enacted − is a key determinant
of their success. Where other actors are seen as passive recipients of
policy decisions they will be given less scope (materially and idealis-
tically) for bottom-up innovation: governments will eﬀectively shift
responsibility and blame rather than share ownership and account-
ability. Where governments invite other actors into the policymaking
process at all stages and encourage autonomy in multiple sites of au-
thority there will be more room for experimentation, economies of scale
and, ultimately, the progression of an inclusive low-carbon transition.
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